

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
 OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

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Investigation of: *

M/V COSCO BUSAN/BRIDGE ALLISION *

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA * Docket No.: DCA-08-MM-004

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Interview of: LTJG JESSICA ANN SNYDER

Wednesday,
 January 30, 2008

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to
 notice, at 10:00 a.m.

BEFORE: CRYSTAL THOMAS
 National Transportation Safety Board

APPEARANCES:

CRYSTAL THOMAS

National Transportation Safety Board

PAUL STANSEL

Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator

National Transportation Safety Board

LT ROBIN ELLERBE

Coast Guard Legal

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:00 a.m.)

MS. THOMAS: It's January 30th, around 10 a.m. This is Crystal Thomas with the NTSB. Today we'll be talking to Lieutenant Junior Grade Snyder. I will go around the room to say who's here.

MR. STANSEL: Paul Stansel (ph.) with the NTSB.

LTJG SNYDER: Lieutenant Junior Grade Snyder from Coast Guard Sector San Francisco.

LT ELLERBE: Lieutenant Ellerbe (ph.) from Coast Guard Legal.

INTERVIEW OF LTJG JESSICA ANN SNYDER

BY MS. THOMAS:

Q. Are you aware that the interview is being recorded?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any problem with that?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Could you please just state your full name?

A. Sure. Lieutenant Junior Grade Jessica Ann Snyder.

Q. And your title?

A. Lieutenant Junior Grade.

Q. Oh, I'm sorry. What is your position?

A. I am in the Incident Management Division.

Q. And what is your title within the Division?

A. I'm an officer on the Division.

1 Q. Officer in the Division. Okay. So what is your role
2 and responsibilities?

3 A. I stand Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representative
4 duty for the Division.

5 Q. And what does that mean?

6 A. That means that if there's an oil spill I will be one
7 of the responders in our division and will -- I have the
8 authority to recommend to the FOSC that we open the fund or
9 conduct cleanup operations and also direct cleanup on the
10 scene.

11 Q. Okay. And what is your background and experience?

12 A. I came to this unit from the Coast Guard Academy in
13 2005, and I've been in -- first I was in Marine Environmental
14 Response at the Marine Safety Office, and when we switched to a
15 sector our division's name changed to Incident Management
16 Division, so I've been doing pollution response for about two-
17 and-a-half years with them. I was a Pollution Investigator. I
18 got qualified in 2005, and then in 2006 I was qualified as an
19 FOSCR.

20 And then as far as the experience, when I first was a
21 Pollution Investigator I had some ICS training, so they sent me
22 to Hurricane Katrina for the pollution response down there, so
23 I was there for 30 days. And then I got involved with the Pac
24 Area IMAT, which is the Incident Management Assist Team, so
25 I've been able to go on additional responses besides those just

1 in this area.

2 Q. Okay. And on the day of the accident what was your
3 role?

4 A. I was the Acting Chief of the Incident Management
5 Division.

6 Q. So on that day what capacity were you acting, what
7 was your responsibility that day?

8 A. I was responsible for our entire division and our
9 response efforts.

10 Q. So as far as response efforts, what sort of decisions
11 did you make or have to make as far as what you were going to
12 do, who you were going to send out?

13 A. Well, we were all in the office doing training when
14 we first got the initial call that a ship had hit the Bay
15 Bridge and it was an unknown spill or anything of that sort and
16 unknown damage to the bridge. They said they were going to
17 send a boat from the Station San Francisco and they'd like some
18 Pollution Investigators to go, so at that point we took two of
19 our Pollution Investigators and sent them to Station San
20 Francisco to go out to assess the bridge and then also the
21 damage to the ship. And then I stayed back to sort of organize
22 from our division.

23 Q. And about what time were you notified of the
24 accident?

25 A. That was at about -- just before 9:00, about 8:56.

1 Q. Okay. And who notified you?

2 A. The Sector Command Center.

3 Q. And did the Sector Command Center decide they were
4 going to send a boat and they requested the PIs from you?

5 A. Yes. They said that they were going to have a boat
6 go out there and they'd like Pollution Investigators and we
7 completely agreed and sent two. And they also informed us at
8 that time that we were going to have a conference call at 9:30
9 or 9:27.

10 Q. How did you decide which Pollution Investigators to
11 send out?

12 A. We had two Pollution Investigators in the office that
13 were -- had all their stuff and they were ready to go and they
14 volunteered and we sent them,

15 Q. And who were they?

16 A. It was MST2 Peter Anderson and MST3 Mike Eaton.

17 Q. What are their experience levels?

18 A. MST2 Anderson has been at the Sector for a few years.
19 He was in the Command Center and came to our division, and
20 they're both -- he was qualified as a Pollution Investigator.
21 And MST3 Eaton has been with our division and he was waiting
22 for his Pollution Investigator board, I believe so, so he was
23 just about to be qualified.

24 Q. Okay. Do you know around what time they went out on
25 the boat?

1 A. They left at 9:03.

2 Q. So before the conference call?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you give them instructions on what they needed to
5 do?

6 A. We told them to go out, assess the bridge, assess if
7 there was any pollution in the water, find out what kind of oil
8 it was and if the vessel had started enacting oil response
9 efforts.

10 Q. What was that last part?

11 A. If the vessel had contacted their OSRO and started to
12 response to if there is any spill.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. So at that point we didn't know.

15 Q. Was one of their directions to determine the quantity
16 of fuel released?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And how would they go about determining the quantity
19 of oil released?

20 A. Well, they would do an assessment from the vessel as
21 far as how much oil they saw, and then they would check the
22 record books onboard the vessel, as well as interview the
23 Captain and any crew members.

24 Q. Okay. So they would, one, do observations?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Of what, the vessel?

2 A. Both the vessel and whatever they see out on the
3 water, and then check the logbooks and interview the Captain
4 and Chief Engineer onboard the vessel.

5 Q. What would they find in the logbooks?

6 A. Just basically try to determine how much was there
7 before and how much is there now and what the difference is.

8 Q. And they would also interview the Chief Engineer?

9 A. Yes, and the Captain of the vessel or the Master of
10 the vessel.

11 Q. What sorts of things would they ask the Chief
12 Engineer and the Master?

13 A. What would they or what did they?

14 Q. What would they and what did they.

15 A. What would they? Well, they would ask how much -- do
16 you know how much has spilled, can we find out how much has
17 spilled, what happened, just -- their role is to find out about
18 the pollution and the pollution response efforts. They want to
19 know if they've contacted their Oil Spill Response
20 Organization, that kind of thing. As far as exactly what
21 questions they asked them, you'd have to ask them exactly what
22 they asked.

23 Q. Okay. So would they be able to determine the
24 quantity on their own or would they be relying on what the
25 Chief Engineer told them?

1 A. Well, they would go through with the Chief Engineer
2 to see -- basically just try to decipher it from asking him
3 questions and then also going to see if they could actually do
4 it onboard the ship.

5 Q. Do a what?

6 A. Do some soundings with him or, you know, other
7 things, but they weren't trained to do it themselves without
8 the Chief Engineer's help.

9 Q. Okay. What observations did they report to you upon
10 leaving at 9:03?

11 A. They reported that they -- first they went to the
12 bridge abutment where the incident had occurred, and they
13 reported that it didn't look like there was any big structural
14 damage as far as the integrity of the bridge. And then they
15 continued on and said that they saw a three-foot wide strip of
16 oil from the incident site to the vessel at Anchorage 7. And
17 then when they got to Anchorage 7 they said that they saw the
18 gash in the side of the ship, and at that point they were
19 requested to board the vessel.

20 Q. Did they mention anything about the sounding tubes
21 before they boarded?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Were they reporting directly to you?

24 A. They were reporting to our division, so I was there
25 with Chief Moseley who was my -- the Chief of the division, so

1 the two of us were working together. So they weren't going
2 directly to me on my cell phone. They were ringing the Chief
3 and then we were -- I was working at the Command Center and
4 also the Command, so doing more briefings and also calling our
5 NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator to get some assistance, so
6 we were kind of doing it separately.

7 Q. Okay. So they were contacting Chief Moseley on his
8 cell phone?

9 A. Yes. I believe it was Chief Moseley or another
10 person in the division, and then they were reporting it to --
11 and I was still there.

12 Q. Okay. So when Moseley or whoever else got the
13 information, received it, who did they relay it to?

14 A. They relayed that to me, as well as the other Petty
15 Officers in the division.

16 Q. And then who did you relay it to?

17 A. And then we relayed it also to the Sector Command
18 Center if we knew that the Pollution Investigator wouldn't have
19 time to do that, but the Pollution Investigator was also in
20 contact with the Command Center directly. And then I was also
21 reporting -- well, later on some things to Commander DeQuattro
22 and the Captain.

23 MR. STANSEL: Did you say the Pollution Investigators
24 were in direct communication with the Command Center, as well?

25 LTJG SNYDER: They called them with some of the

1 reports, as well, so they would call us and the Command Center.

2 MR. STANSEL: Sorry.

3 MS. THOMAS: No, that's fine.

4 BY MS. THOMAS:

5 Q. Did you report the observations as far as the bridge
6 damage, the three-foot wide oil slick and the size of the gash
7 in the ship, did you report that to anybody directly?

8 A. I don't remember exactly if it was me that relayed it
9 to the Command Center or if it was the team on-scene, and I
10 don't remember, but I do know that we got a picture of the gash
11 on the side of the ship on our cell phone. We brought that to
12 the Command Center to show them, so we made sure we were on the
13 same page.

14 Q. Okay. And who were you in contact with in the
15 Command Center.

16 A. Lieutenant JG Ford.

17 Q. Anyone else?

18 A. The other -- on watch, and we just walked into the
19 Command Center and talked to them.

20 Q. Okay. Was Commander DeQuattro and Captain Uberti in
21 the Command Center?

22 A. At that time --

23 Q. Okay. How long were you in the Command Center?

24 A. I don't know, just a few minutes, and that was early
25 on in the day.

1 Q. Okay. So where were you located?

2 A. We were located in our Incident Management Division
3 spaces.

4 Q. Okay. And where is that?

5 A. That's in the next building.

6 Q. Okay. So if you were talking to the Command Center,
7 then you were doing so by cell phone or by radio?

8 A. Well, this particular time that we did that, that
9 was -- we walked from our spaces to the Command Center to make
10 sure they had all the same information we did, and on our way
11 there is when we ran into the Fish and Game representatives, as
12 well. So we walked up to the Command Center, made sure we were
13 all on the same page and then came back down. At that time
14 then the Fish and Game representatives were notified because
15 they were all coming out of the Neptune Coalition meeting, and
16 then they came back to our spaces with us to start running the
17 response together.

18 Q. Okay. As far as the Pollution Investigators onboard,
19 what did they initially report once they boarded the vessel?

20 A. Their initial report or --

21 Q. What did they --

22 A. When they got onboard they said that they were
23 speaking with the Master of the vessel and the Chief Engineer,
24 and that they were still conducting their investigation
25 onboard. And then later -- I mean it was just a series of

1 reports throughout the morning.

2 Q. So what did they report just throughout the morning?

3 A. They reported that they were having some trouble
4 coming to an estimate. The sounding tubes were damaged in
5 the -- what do you call it, the allision, and they were still
6 working on getting those numbers. And then later on they
7 reported what type of material it was and they reported that
8 they had contacted their Oil Spill Response Organization.

9 Q. Did they mention they were having any difficulties
10 communicating with any of the crew members?

11 A. They did say that there was a language barrier.

12 Q. With anyone in particular?

13 A. No, not -- at that time it was just -- that was --

14 Q. As far as the report from the Pollution Investigators
15 of 146 gallons, did you receive that report?

16 A. We got the report of -- they said that the Chief
17 Engineer had done some calculations with them and all they
18 could see was a difference of .4 metric tons which converted to
19 about that amount, but that was their first estimate based on
20 his report.

21 Q. And did he express much certainty in that quantity or
22 did he express --

23 A. I don't know. I wasn't there with him, so -- you
24 mean the Pollution Investigator --

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. -- when they told us? They didn't tell me that
2 figure directly.

3 Q. Who did you hear it from?

4 A. It was in our division spaces, so it was when the
5 Pollution Investigator called. It was either MST2 Munoz or
6 Chief Moseley. I can't remember.

7 Q. Okay. And then they relayed that to you?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. And did you do with that information, did you
10 pass that along to anyone?

11 A. We just -- we said that that's what we had heard so
12 far, but they were still working on figuring out how much had
13 spilled.

14 Q. Based on the observations he reported, the bridge and
15 then the oil slick that he followed, the size of the tear, the
16 fact that the sounding tubes were bent, and then he reported .4
17 metric tons, 146 gallons, did that lead you to believe that
18 that number was correct? Were you even thinking about --

19 A. We just knew we were continuing with the
20 investigation and it didn't change our actions.

21 Q. Did it sound right to you or did you think about it
22 at all? Was anybody assessing --

23 A. We knew that we had to get more information on how
24 much was spilled, so we weren't stopping at that first number
25 that we got.

1 Q. Okay. So when that number came in, did anybody in
2 the Incident Management Division that was in your space say 146
3 gallons, that doesn't seem right, or 146 gallons, okay, let's
4 go with this?

5 A. No. We never went with that as that's exactly how
6 much spilled. We knew we wanted to get some additional
7 information, and at that point we were talking with the
8 Department of Fish and Game and we knew they had an expert that
9 would go out to the ship and be able to figure it out himself.

10 Q. Did anyone question the small number or the small
11 quantity figure based on the observations?

12 A. Well, I guess we just never really took that number
13 in as that is exactly how much it is. We knew it was -- there
14 was oil spilled and we were still identifying the number of
15 gallons, but we never, you know, stopped at that number. Once
16 we had gotten some other estimates from -- you know, the Pilot
17 said he thought it might be ten barrels, so we were just -- we
18 just kept going with the investigation and we kept going with
19 our response at the same rate.

20 Q. Did the Pilot report to you or --

21 A. No, not to me.

22 Q. He just --

23 A. No. I heard that through the Sector Command Center.

24 Q. Okay. So as you were going on with your
25 investigation what action did you take after sending the

1 Pollution Investigation Team out? Did you send anybody else
2 out?

3 A. Yes. At that point we told that Pollution
4 Investigation Team that they were going to switch our with a
5 second team with one Pollution -- another Pollution
6 Investigator and three Fish and Game representatives to do
7 the -- to find out exactly how much spilled and the other two
8 to do their investigation, and our Pollution Investigator would
9 start taking samples, and then that first team left and they
10 took samples from the water.

11 Q. Okay. So this relief team that was coming on with
12 the three people from OSPR and the one Pollution Investigator,
13 who was that Pollution Investigator?

14 A. MST3 Martin.

15 Q. Do you know the first name?

16 A. Lucas Martin.

17 Q. What is his experience level?

18 A. He's also a qualified Pollution Investigator.

19 Q. How long has he been a Pollution Investigator?

20 A. I couldn't tell you exactly.

21 Q. Couple years or a couple months?

22 A. A few years.

23 Q. Okay. Who decided to send him out with the OSPR
24 people?

25 A. He was another Pollution Investigator that we had in

1 our office, and we told him to --

2 Q. So no particular reason to choose him?

3 A. No. It was just he was one of --

4 Q. Okay. And what was he briefed on, what was his role?

5 A. He was to go onboard with the other three and take
6 samples from the vessel.

7 Q. And take samples?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was the other Pollution Investigation Team told to
10 take samples, as well?

11 A. They took samples from the water.

12 Q. Okay. So he was supposed to take samples from
13 vessel?

14 A. From the vessel tanks.

15 Q. Was MST3 Martin to assist OSPR, was he supposed to be
16 involved in the calculations or the assessment?

17 A. No. He was going to take samples from the vessel as
18 a Pollution Investigator.

19 Q. Okay. But not to assist OSPR with their work?

20 A. No. He was just there to find out, you know, and get
21 samples, not --

22 Q. Do you know who the OSPR people were?

23 A. I know that it was Roy Mathers (ph.) was -- went
24 onboard to figure out how much had been spilled.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. And then there were two more that went to the
2 investigation. I can't remember exactly who it is.

3 Q. Okay. Did Martin stay on the vessel the whole time
4 that the OSPR people were on there?

5 A. He did, yes.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. He left just before Roy.

8 Q. Left to go to the vessel or leave?

9 A. Left the vessel, I believe, with the first team, and
10 then Roy stayed to finish the calculations, so they took a few
11 hours.

12 Q. He -- okay, wait.

13 A. I think that's -- honestly, I can't remember exactly
14 who came back, but two groups came back. The first group came
15 back earlier than the second, and they had finished their
16 investigation and Roy was continuing with the soundings and
17 figuring out how much had spilled.

18 Q. Okay. So Martin came back with the first Pollution
19 Investigator --

20 A. That's what I don't remember.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. He came back with one of the two because there were
23 two rides back.

24 Q. Okay. We can maybe talk to him and find out. So did
25 he talk with you or anyone else at all about his interaction

1 with OSPR, with Roy Mathers, what he was doing?

2 A. No, not at all.

3 Q. Did he have any role in sounding the tanks or
4 transferring fuel?

5 A. Not that -- I don't believe so, but you'll have to
6 talk to him about that.

7 Q. Did he also write up a summary of his actions?

8 A. Yes, he should have done that, as well.

9 Q. Okay. While he was onboard, did he relay any
10 information to you or to anyone else in the Incident Management
11 Division?

12 A. He didn't relay anything to me. I don't know of him
13 relaying to other --

14 Q. So while all this was going on OSPR was onboard doing
15 their calculations. Who decided to send OSPR out?

16 A. That was a joint decision between us and OSPR. We
17 were all together at that point in our office spaces, and they
18 said that they had wanted to go out to the vessel and we had
19 wanted someone to go who could do the calculations themselves
20 and find out how much was spilled and Roy is the expert.

21 Q. Okay. So the incident -- he was with the Incident
22 Management Division or was --

23 A. Yes, yes. They were -- we were all together. I'm
24 not sure at what point Roy got on-scene, but his colleagues
25 were all there, and then Roy arrived and then we sent them out.

1 Q. Okay. So was it Captain Uberti's decision or was the
2 Incident Management Division's decision to send out a team with
3 the expert?

4 A. We recommended we send that team.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I mean this was all being briefed through the Command
7 Center.

8 Q. But you guys recommended it. That's good because he
9 got the calculations done, so it worked out well. Okay. Do
10 you know how long it took him to do the calculations?

11 A. It took a few hours. I know that they went out
12 around noon and we didn't find out the number of gallons
13 spilled until like 1700 or -- when that Commanding General
14 staff meeting was was when we heard the estimate.

15 Q. Did he send back any information to you while he was
16 onboard or anybody in the Incident Management Division or did
17 he only report the figure when he came to the Unified Command?

18 A. We did not talk to him before he came back and
19 presented the numbers to everyone.

20 Q. Okay. When he presented the figure, was there any
21 questioning of it? Did it -- what was the reaction based on
22 the fact that the initial report was 146 gallons, he comes back
23 maybe five hours after he went out and says we have 50-some-
24 thousand gallons?

25 A. The reaction from people in the room?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. They just took in that number. I don't remember if
3 people were really surprised or -- I mean we knew we were
4 getting reports of oil and we were still responding as if it
5 was -- you know, as we always do. We responded with everything
6 we had and then we got that number. I don't remember what
7 everyone's reaction was.

8 Q. So the change in the figure didn't change the
9 response?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. Did you have any interaction with the State or
12 any local municipalities or cities?

13 A. I spoke with -- I have that written down, exactly who
14 I talked to. I talked to East Bay Regional Parks. They were
15 given my contact number, so I spoke with them, and I also spoke
16 with some of the folks on Alcatraz, so the National Park
17 Service.

18 Q. What did they tell you?

19 A. They just were reporting where they were seeing the
20 oil and the Park Service had requested to come to the Command
21 Post. We told them where we were located. And then the folks
22 on Alcatraz were just reporting where they were seeing oil on
23 the end.

24 Q. When they were giving these reports who were you
25 passing them on to?

1 A. I was reporting them to -- at that point we were
2 here, at our Incident Command Post, so Commander DeQuattro and
3 Captain Uberti, as well as Rob Roberts and some other OSPR
4 folks were all in the room, so I just -- I told them that they
5 had wanted to come and they said okay.

6 Q. And what were they doing with the reports of oil at
7 various locations around the area?

8 A. I mean we were recording those, and then also we had
9 an NRC rep and a MSRC rep come to the Command Post, as well, so
10 we were making sure that they were seeing oil in the same
11 places that --

12 Q. Did the reports of oil in various locations set off
13 any alarms that maybe it might be larger than 146 gallons?

14 A. I mean I think that was always kind of something we
15 were thinking about. It was -- you know, we didn't stop at
16 that number. It didn't change our response at all.

17 Q. Okay. Was there any talk of notifying the City of
18 San Francisco or questioning whether they had been notified
19 yet?

20 A. We did check to make sure that NRC and OES were
21 notified, but that was the extent of it.

22 Q. Okay. And were they notified?

23 A. They were, yes.

24 Q. Would it be Sector San Francisco's responsibility to
25 contact the City or would it be somebody else's?

1 A. Our responsibility by the Area Contingency Plan is to
2 insure that the National Response Center and OES were
3 notified --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- and they were both notified.

6 Q. Would it be OES' responsibility to contact local
7 jurisdictions?

8 A. That's what -- on their OES report they put local
9 jurisdictions on there, county OES' and --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I'm not sure exactly how the whole process works,
12 but --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And then we were also -- I know our SCAT Teams -- we
15 sent the SCAT teams out to the San Francisco waterfront and
16 also to some other areas, and they did report that they were
17 speaking with the San Francisco Police Department and some --
18 the local Police Marine Unit was out.

19 Q. Okay. What are the SCAT teams?

20 A. Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Teams.

21 Q. Were they Coast Guard vessels or --

22 A. They were shoreline, so we had some more of our
23 Pollution Investigators go out in vehicles and check the
24 shorelines and some Fish and Game reps did the same.

25 Q. Was this on Day 1?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you know around what time the SCAT teams were sent
3 out?

4 A. It's on this time line, exactly what time they left,
5 but it was -- the one left for the San Francisco waterfront at
6 12:02, and I'd have to look and see when each SCAT team left.

7 Q. And do you know around how many left or were sent
8 out?

9 A. No, not off the top of my head. There were a couple
10 of SCAT teams, though.

11 Q. Who would decide to send them out, whose decision
12 would that be?

13 A. Our Incident Management Division wanted to send some
14 SCAT teams, so it was at the same time us going with OSPR.
15 OSPR had sent their teams and then we also sent some teams.

16 Q. What kind of crews were on the SCAT teams?

17 A. They were made up of Pollution Investigators and
18 Federal On-Scene Coordinator Representatives.

19 Q. And what was their role again?

20 A. They are to assess the shoreline to see where there
21 was any oil.

22 Q. What kind of reports were they sending back?

23 A. They were reporting that they saw oil along the San
24 Francisco waterfront and they were continuing around and just
25 were making reports of where there was oil.

1 Q. And who were they reporting to?

2 A. They were reporting back to the Incident Command
3 Post --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- so to all of us in the --

6 Q. Okay.

7 MS. THOMAS: Paul, did you have some questions you
8 wanted to ask?

9 MR. STANSEL: Yes, just a few.

10 BY MR. STANSEL:

11 Q. Paul Stansel with NTSB. Which local officials were
12 involved with the SCAT teams?

13 A. Oh, they weren't involved with the SCAT teams, but
14 they spoke with our SCAT teams when they were out in the field.

15 Q. What agencies?

16 A. That was -- I know there was the San Francisco Police
17 Department, and I believe --

18 Q. What sort of contact was that? Were they asking what
19 they were doing or were they accompanying them on their rounds?

20 A. They were just -- they had met up at some point and
21 talked about where they had seen oil, but you'd have to ask the
22 SCAT teams exactly where they met them and where they went.

23 Q. Was the Command Center receiving any reports directly
24 from the OSROs?

25 A. I don't know if they were directly.

1 Q. Did any one of the contractors' representatives
2 arrive here with information about how much oil he might have
3 seen?

4 A. We had -- I was given an e-mail from the Command
5 Center with the name of the qualified individual and also the
6 name of the person from the OSRO that was running it for them,
7 and at that point I called the qualified individual and found
8 out what was going on and reported that back to Command Center
9 and our Command. And then we did request that the OSRO's
10 representative, so both NRC and MSRC, come to the Command Post
11 and be their representatives.

12 Q. Did they have any information developed from their
13 own people as to how much oil they thought they were dealing
14 with?

15 A. No. I never heard any number.

16 Q. No?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. Was there some sort of effort being made to
19 determine what the maximum potential of this spill was?

20 A. As far as the capacity?

21 Q. The capacity of the damaged tanks.

22 A. Of the tanks. I did not have that information that
23 morning.

24 Q. Was that an objective of the Pollution Investigation
25 Team or --

1 A. No, that was not. We were just trying to figure out
2 how much had been spilled.

3 Q. Did anybody bring that question up, okay, we have a
4 report of 140 gallons, but the maximum potential could be X?

5 A. I didn't know the maximum potential at the time.

6 Q. Okay. I don't have anything else.

7 BY MS. THOMAS:

8 Q. I think that's all the questions I have. Did you
9 have anything you'd like to add that you think could help us in
10 our investigation?

11 A. No. I think that's it.

12 Q. Okay. Well, thank you very much for your time. We
13 appreciate it.

14 A. Thank you.

15 (Whereupon, the interview in the above-entitled
16 matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: M/V COSCO BUSAN/BRIDGE ALLISION
 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
 Interview of LTJG Jessica Snyder

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-08-MM-004

PLACE:

DATE: January 30, 2008

was held according to the record, and that this is the
original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been
compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

Cheryl L. Phipps
Transcriber

Crystal,

Here are LTjg Snyder's comments. Please let me know if you need further clarification.

V/r,
Robin

-----Original Message-----

From: Snyder, Jessica LTJG

Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2008 2:17 PM

To: Ellerbe, Robin LT

Subject: Interview

I hope this clarifies things. If there are any more questions please give me a call. Thanks!

v/r,
Jess

Pg. 10 line 24/Pg. 11 lines 7, 9 & 12 - Chief Mosley was spelled incorrectly.

Pg. 12 line 16 - The person in the Command Center was Mr. Joe Ford, he is a civilian.

Pg. 12 line 22 - It looks like I am saying that at that time CDR DeQuattro and CAPT Uberti were in the Command Center, but I don't believe they were.

I only spoke with the watch standers.

Pg. 17 line 22 - MST3 Martin had been qualified for months and not years.

Pg. 21 line 13 - It was a Command and General Staff Meeting.

Pg. 22 line 23 - The people from Alcatraz were reporting oil on the island.